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Introduction 
Together with human rights, global warming, poverty reduction and non-proliferation, 
terrorism has emerged as one of the most politically significant discourses of the 
modern era. Today, terrorism is a ubiquitous term of public discourse and its 
associated labels, assumptions and narratives are embedded within innumerable 
official, academic and cultural texts. It has, in fact, taken on the qualities of a negative 
ideograph and like „freedom‟, „democracy‟ and „justice‟, now functions as a primary 
purpose term for the central narratives of the culture; although loaded with culturally-
specific meanings, the term „terrorism‟ is now widely understood and ubiquitous in 
political debate and daily conversation.
2
 Central to the broader terrorism discourse is 
the sometimes controversial notion of „terrorist sanctuaries‟ or „terrorist havens‟ – 
understood as the places and spaces where terrorists take refuge, receive support, 
train, plan, organise and launch their attacks from. It would be difficult to over-
estimate the importance of the language of „terrorist sanctuaries‟, not least because it 
has been used by officials to justify three major wars in the past five years 
(Afghanistan, Iraq and South Lebanon) and numerous other military actions in places 
like Palestine, Pakistan, Georgia, Yemen, the Philippines, Chechnya, Somalia and 
elsewhere. In other words, speaking and writing about „terrorist sanctuaries‟ is much 
more than simply an academic exercise. It has the potential to affect policy outcomes 
involving the use of military force and the resultant destruction of human life – not to 
mention expending vast human and material resources. 
 The purpose of this paper is to critically examine the academic and political 
language and understanding of „terrorist sanctuaries.‟ Specifically, it aims to describe 
and dissect its central assumptions, labels, narratives and genealogical roots, and to 
reflect on its political and normative consequences. The central argument is fairly 
simple: the discourse of „terrorist sanctuaries‟ is deeply problematic in its current 
form, not least because it is vague and imprecise, selectively and politically applied, 
founded on a number of highly contested assumptions and narratives, and functions in 
part to obscure state sources of terror. Perhaps more importantly, the current „terrorist 
sanctuaries‟ discourse enables powerful states to pursue a range of hegemonic 
projects, including system maintenance, regime change, military expansion and the 
consolidation of domestic state power. 
The methodological approach I employ in this study falls broadly under the 
mantle of critical discourse analysis.
3
 This approach is at once both a technique for 
analysing political language and specific texts, and a way of understanding the 
relationship between discourse and social and political practice.
4
 Discourses are 
related sets of ideas that are expressed in various kinds of written and spoken texts, 
and which employ a distinct arrangement of vocabularies, rules, symbols, labels, 
assumptions, narratives and forms of social action.  
Discourses function ideologically because they dictate what it is possible to 
say or not say about a certain subject, what counts as normal, what is seen as 
commonsense and what can be accepted as legitimate „knowledge.‟ This is not to 
suggest that discourses are always completely uniform, coherent or consistent; there 
are often exceptions and inconsistencies within and between texts. Many of the 
„terrorist sanctuaries‟ experts quoted in this paper for example, upon a close reading, 
can be seen to express quite nuanced arguments that contain both supportive and 
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oppositional statements towards the overall discourse. Nor is it to say that discourses 
are always completely hegemonic; there are always areas of contestation and 
vulnerability. It is however, to stress that discourses are never neutral or objective. 
They are an exercise in social power – the power to ascribe right and wrong, 
knowledge and falsehood, and the limits of the reasonable. This is because they set 
the parameters of debate and establish the boundaries for possible action. In the public 
policy context, discourses establish the limits, possibilities and interests of policy 
formulation, primarily by making some options appear reasonable and others 
nonsensical. It is not that interests play no role in the formulation of policy, but that 
interests themselves are discursively constructed and reflect other discourses and 
narratives of national security, threats, identities, values, relationships and the like.
5
 
The primary research for this paper entailed a discourse analysis of prominent 
academic and official texts that discussed „terrorist sanctuaries‟, including speeches 
by senior policy-makers, the reports of governmental commissions, papers by 
important think-tanks and academic books and articles on the subject. Each text was 
examined for the labels, assumptions, symbols, rules and narratives it deployed, the 
kinds of existing cultural-political narratives it tapped into, and the ways in which the 
language functioned to structure the meanings, logic and potential policy responses to 
the described events. Lastly, it is important to note that for the purposes of this paper, 
terrorism is defined broadly as civilian-directed, politically-motivated violence 
designed to cause fear and intimidate. This conceptualisation incorporates both 
narrowly defined acts of sub-state terrorism and more broadly defined activities that 
harm civilians – regardless of whether they are perpetrated by states or sub-state 
actors 
 
‘Terrorist Sanctuaries’ in Academic and Political Discourse 
The current notion of „terrorist sanctuaries‟ is not new. It has been an important part 
of the terrorism discourse for many decades. In this section, I provide an overview of 
the genealogical roots and central narratives of the „terrorist sanctuaries‟ discourse. 
 
The Genealogy of the „Terrorist Sanctuaries‟ Discourse 
It is important to note that discourses do not emerge from a vacuum. Rather, they 
build upon and are shaped by existing discourses and narratives. In this sense, 
discourses have discernible histories or genealogies and build upon the discursive 
foundations laid down by previous texts.  
The genealogy of the „terrorist sanctuaries‟ discourse, unsurprisingly, lies first 
and foremost in the language and knowledge of terrorism studies – a field which has a 
long history and which has grown extremely large and gained genuine authority in 
recent years, particularly since the September 11 terrorist attacks.
6
 The terrorism 
studies literature provides a great many of the central assumptions, labels, concepts, 
terms and narratives of the „terrorist sanctuaries‟ discourse. Importantly, through 
processes like testifying before Congressional Commissions, publications and media 
appearances, the language and knowledge of terrorism studies has been transmitted 
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directly to policymakers.
7
 For example, notable terrorism studies scholars like Martha 
Crenshaw, Bruce Hoffman, Walter Laqueur, Jessica Stern, Paul Wilkinson, Brian 
Jenkins, Magnus Ranstorp, Rohan Gunaratna and Daniel Byman have given 




A second genealogical root of the discourse lies in Western counter-
insurgency doctrine during the cold war, which in turn exhibited clear discursive 
continuities with colonial „pacification‟ doctrines.9 During this phase, terrorism and 
insurgency were treated largely as being synonymous,
10
 and a great many countries 
experiencing civil war such as Vietnam, Guatemala and the Philippines were 
described by western policymakers as „terrorist havens.‟ Furthermore, it was 
frequently argued that communism itself provided ideological support and 
justification for terrorism, thereby acting as an „ideological haven.‟11 A number of 
terrorism scholars at this time suggested that the Soviet Union was the primary 
sponsor and supporter of a global „terrorist network.‟ Claire Sterling‟s popular and 
deeply alarmist book, The Terror Network,
12
 promoted this view, and was highly 
praised by Reagan, Alexander Haig, William Casey, and other senior Administration 
officials, who frequently used Sterling‟s narratives in their own speeches.13  
It was in the 1980s however, that the language and assumptions of the broader 
terrorism discourse really took root in Western policy circles. President Reagan 
frequently referred to „state-sponsored terrorism‟ and along with other Western allies, 
employed the language of „terrorist sanctuaries‟ to justify a range of aggressive 
foreign policies. For example, Reagan justified the invasion of Grenada on the 
grounds that „It was a Soviet-Cuban colony, being readied as a major military bastion 
to export terror and undermine democracy.‟14 Following Reagan, George Bush Sr and 
Bill Clinton continued to employ the language of „international terrorism‟, „terrorist 
sanctuaries‟ and „state sponsors of terrorism‟ to justify a range of foreign policies, 
including the 1991 Gulf War, sanctions against Iraq and Iran, the „war on drugs‟ in 
Latin America and the missile attacks on Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998.
15
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In short, by the time of the 11 September 2001 attacks, the discursive 
foundations of the „terrorist sanctuaries‟ discourse were well established: 
policymakers and the wider public were well-versed in, and fully understood, the 
language of „terrorist sanctuaries,‟ „terrorist havens‟ and „state sponsors of terrorism.‟ 
Since then, senior policymakers and academics have elaborated a whole series of 
specific narratives about the nature of „terrorist sanctuaries‟, the states and groups that 
support them, the kinds of regions they inhabit, the financial systems they exploit, the 
extremist ideologies they depend on and the threat they pose to the world. 
 
The Central Narratives of the „Terrorist Sanctuaries‟ Discourse 
A review of many of the primary „terrorist sanctuaries‟ texts reveal a number of 
common narratives, many of which are linked to, and embedded within, the broader 
„war on terrorism‟ discourse.16 Due to the sheer size of the discourse – there are 
literally thousands of academic and political texts on terrorism and „terrorist 
sanctuaries‟ – the following discussion is merely illustrative of the primary narratives 
and discursive constructions. The important point is not that each author or text 
uniformly expresses all the main narratives in the same way, or even that they 
necessarily agree with all of them; it is rather, that taken together as a broad body of 
work that has political and cultural influence, the narratives function to construct and 
maintain a specific understanding of, and approach to, „terrorist sanctuaries‟. 
One of the most common narratives of the discourse is that weak or failed 
states are primary locations for „terrorist sanctuaries.‟ More specifically, it is argued 
that lawless, geographically remote regions beyond the control of ineffectual states 
can function as a staging ground or „haven‟ for terrorism. The 9/11 Commission for 
example, stated: 
 
To find sanctuary, terrorist organizations have fled to some of the least governed, most 
lawless places in the world. The intelligence community has prepared a world map that 
highlights possible terrorist havens, using no secret intelligence – just indicating areas 
that combine rugged terrain, weak governance, room to hide or receive supplies, and 
low population density with a town or city near enough to allow interaction with the 




Within the logic of this particular narrative, regions like the Pakistan-Afghanistan 
border region, the Arabian Peninsular, the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, among 
others, automatically become probable „terrorist sanctuaries.‟ A report by the 
International Crisis Group for example, concluded that Somalia remained a real 
concern due to the possibility of terrorists „using the environment of the Somali 
collapsed state as a safe haven to operate with impunity.‟18 Similarly, a recent book on 
terrorism in the Horn of Africa argues that the combination of its rugged terrain, 
Muslim population and weak governance make it a potential „reservoir of terror.‟19  
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A related narrative is that poverty, unemployment and conditions of 
underdevelopment are „breeding grounds‟ of terrorism, which is another way of 
saying that they are a kind of „terrorist sanctuary‟ or „haven.‟ A British government 
report for example, argues that deprivation and alienation are key variables in the 
radicalisation process. It states: „Some young Muslims who join extremist groups or 
are targeted by them are poorly educated and from deprived backgrounds.‟20 
Similarly, the 9/11 Commission argues that „endemic poverty, widespread corruption, 
and often ineffective government create opportunities for Islamist recruitment.‟ It 
goes on to opine that „when people lose hope, when societies break down, when 
countries fragment, the breeding grounds for terrorism are created.‟21 In short, 
drawing on sociological theories of relative deprivation and revolution, this narrative 
identifies conditions of poverty as an „incubator‟ of terrorist violence.  
A recent narrative is that „passive state sponsorship‟ provides a haven for 
terrorists – that inaction is just as significant as action. Daniel Byman for example, 
argues that „For many terrorist groups, a state‟s tolerance of or passivity towards their 
activities is often as important to their success as any deliberate assistance they 
receive‟, and that „At times, the greatest contribution a state can make to a terrorist‟s 
cause is by not policing a border, turning a blind eye to fundraising, or even tolerating 
terrorist efforts to build their organizations, conduct operations, and survive.‟22 
Interestingly, such a construction of state sponsorship is broadly reflective of the Bush 
administration‟s oft-quoted and much more extreme assertion that there is no neutral 
ground in the war on terrorism. As President Bush put it, „… we will pursue nations 
that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a 
decision to make. Either you are either with us, or you are with the terrorists.‟23 The 
implication is that any state that fails to rigorously pursue terrorists within its borders 
is by definition providing a „terrorist sanctuary.‟ 
 Perhaps the most common narrative however, is that terrorist groups depend 
upon significant state support to survive and active „sponsors‟ provide a range of 
positive and permissive forms of assistance. A prominent terrorism textbook for 
suggests that state sponsorship of terrorism can consist of: „ideological support‟, 
„financial support‟, „military support‟, operational support‟, „initiating terrorist 
attacks‟, or „direct involvement in terrorist attacks.‟24 Additionally, it is commonly 
argued that weak, totalitarian or so-called „rogue states‟ are predisposed to sponsoring 
terrorism because:  
 
[F]or aggressive regimes, state terrorism in the international domain is advantageous in 
several respects: State terrorism is inexpensive… Even poor nations can strike at and 
injure a prosperous adversary… State terrorism has limited consequences. State 
assisters that are clever can distance themselves from culpability for a terrorist 
incident… and thereby escape possible reprisals or other penalties. State terrorism can 
be successful. Weaker states can raise the stakes beyond what a stronger adversary is 
                                                 
20
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willing to bear… [and] successfully destabilize an adversary through the use of a proxy 
movement.
25
   
 
In fact, much of the „terrorist sanctuaries‟ literature is devoted to analysing and 
describing those states viewed as the main sponsors of terrorism, the groups they 
support and the kinds of assistance they provide. The state sponsors identified in the 
literature more often than not coincide with the U.S. State Department‟s annual list of 
„state sponsors of international terrorism,‟ which typically includes countries with 
which the U.S. has had serious conflicts, such as Iran, Syria, Cuba, North Korea, 
Sudan, Libya and Iraq. 
A narrative that has become virtually ubiquitous in contemporary terrorism 
texts suggests that Islam, particularly militant forms of political Islam or what is often 
called „Islamism‟, also function as a „terrorist sanctuary.‟ In this narrative, Islamic 
doctrines and practices provide ideological or religious support for terrorist activities. 
A great many texts for example, assert an „inherent, even organic connection that has 
always existed between Political Islam and violence‟ due to the fact that „Islam does 
not separate the realms of religion and politics.‟26 Similarly, it is often argued that „in 
the Islamic world one cannot differentiate between the political violence of Islamic 
groups and their popular support derived from religion… the present terrorism on the 
part of the Arab and Muslim world is Islamic in nature.‟27 In particular, it is 
considered axiomatic that „Islamist‟, „Wahabist‟ and „Salafist‟ groups are linked to, 
directly involved in or provide support for terrorism. Magnus Ranstorp for example, 
refers to „the Islamist movements and their respective armed “terrorist” wings‟28 – as 
if all Islamist groups support terrorists. The terrorism-Islamism association contained 
in these discursive formations works to construct the widely-accepted „knowledge‟ 




Within the broader narrative of the dangers posed by radical Islam, it is often 
argued that Islamic charities, associations and nongovernmental organisations can 
also provide support for „Islamic terrorists‟, either intentionally or inadvertently. Paul 
Pillar for example, identifies „certain nongovernmental organizations that facilitate, 
wittingly or unwittingly, the activities of terrorists.‟30 Similarly, Byman argues that 
„NGOs are a means of raising money, but they also are valuable for giving activists 
jobs, channelling money, and acquiring necessary documents.‟31 Directly related to 
this, there is a frequently expressed narrative that identifies diasporas, particularly 
Muslim communities, as potential „terrorist sanctuaries.‟ In a variation of the „enemy 
within‟ or „fifth column‟ narrative, it is suggested that diasporic communities provide 
terrorists with places to hide, jobs, contacts, finance and logistical and ideological 
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support. Specifically, a large number of recent texts identify Muslim communities 
living in Western countries as potential and actual terrorist havens. The widely-quoted 
term, „Londonistan,‟ is a pertinent example of this particular narrative,32 as is Robert 
Leiken‟s description of „Europe‟s Angry Muslims‟ in Foreign Affairs: „In smoky 
coffeehouses in Rotterdam and Copenhagen, makeshift prayer halls in Hamburg and 
Brussels, Islamic bookstalls in Birmingham and “Londonistan,” and the prisons of 
Madrid, Milan, and Marseilles, immigrants or their descendents are volunteering for 
jihad against the West.‟33 In short, virtually any significant population of immigrants, 
particularly those of Muslim origin, are viewed within these texts as „havens‟ for 
terrorism. 
Another popular narrative is that democracy and freedom in liberal states 
provides a „haven‟ or „sanctuary‟ for terrorists, as it allows them to move about, 
organise and generally operate without interference from the authorities. Byman for 
example, notes that „Many activities related to terrorism – proselytizing, fundraising, 
and even recruiting – are at times protected by laws governing free speech and free 
association.‟34 Politically, this narrative has been used as a reason for restricting civil 
liberties. The British Home Secretary, John Reid, stated: „Sometimes we may have to 
modify some of our own freedoms in the short term in order to prevent their misuse 
and abuse by those who oppose our fundamental values and would destroy all of our 
freedoms in the modern world.‟35 Implicit here is the notion that freedom itself can be 
exploited by terrorists as a „sanctuary.‟ 
Other common narratives of the „terrorist sanctuaries‟ discourse include: the 
frequently heard notion that information technology, and in particular, the internet, 
functions as a „virtual haven‟ for terrorists because it allows them to communicate, 
organise, gather information, recruit and proselytise;
36
 the claim that media coverage 
of terrorism is a kind of „media support‟ because it allows terrorists to reach a much 
bigger audience than they could reach by themselves;
37
 and the important notion that 
dealing with terrorist sanctuaries involves both diplomatic and coercive instruments, 
including sanctions and military intervention. In much of the literature, the use of 
military force as a means of dealing with „terrorist sanctuaries‟ is uncritically assumed 
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Critical Reflections on the ‘Terrorist Sanctuaries’ Discourse 
There are several criticisms that can be levelled at the „terrorist sanctuaries‟ discourse 
as it is currently expressed in academic and official texts. They fall under three main 
headings: analytical shortcomings, political bias and ineffectual policies.  
 
Analytical Shortcomings 
An initial analytical shortcoming of the discourse is that very few academic texts take 
the time to define or conceptualise the notion of „terrorist havens‟ or „sanctuaries.‟39 
Instead, the term is normally used uncritically and unreflectively, but in ways that 
impose a restricted meaning. Most often, it is deployed in discussions about the role 
of commonly agreed „rogue states‟ or „state sponsors‟ in supporting commonly agreed 
„terrorist organisations.‟ Moreover, texts that do attempt to define „terrorist 
sanctuaries‟, „havens‟ or „state sponsorship‟, frequently do so using highly subjective 
measures, such as notions of „ideological support‟ which often assumes that because 
actors share a similar ideology, they are therefore allies. The problem is further 
compounded by texts that argue that „terrorist sanctuaries‟ also lie in extra-
geographically defined realms such as religion, rhetoric, the internet or civil liberties. 
In the end, the term is so broadly applied that every country in the world is 
transformed into a potential „terrorist haven‟ (either through action or inaction), as is 
virtually every aspect of modern life. Clearly, in order to retain analytical value, the 
term needs to distinguish between what a „terrorist sanctuary‟ is and what it is not, 
and employ a set of criterion and a threshold of evidence to determine when a 
particular state or social arena has become a „terrorist sanctuary.‟ 
 Related to this, the literature is characterised by an extremely poor level of 
empirical documentation, a great deal of innuendo and an over-reliance on official 
sources. For example, a surprising number of „terrorist sanctuaries‟ texts discussed 
official Iraqi support for international terrorism in the lead-up to the 2003 invasion, 
despite the lack of any hard evidence.
40
 The primary reason for this is that state 
sponsorship of terrorism is rarely openly admitted and reliable information may be 
difficult to come by; thus, scholars tend to over-rely on information provided to them 
by officials. However, there are two compelling reasons why official sources of 
information on state sponsorship of terrorism should be viewed with caution. First, 
states are often willing to make political judgements on the basis of very thin 
evidence, particularly if there are strategic interests in designating a state as a „sponsor 
of terrorism.‟ A U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence argued that „It is not 
necessary to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt” that a state has supported terrorism… 
reliance can be placed on circumstantial, as opposed to direct, evidence.‟41 A careful 
examination of the actual evidence of state support for terrorism in most „terrorist 
sanctuaries‟ texts reveals that in fact, a great deal of it is circumstantial and open to a 
variety of interpretations. A partial solution to this problem would be to follow the 
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lead of Byman in carefully distinguishing between strong, weak, lukewarm, 
antagonistic, passive and unwilling state supporters of terrorism.
42
 
A second reason to be wary of official information is that where foreign policy 
is concerned governments frequently have an incentive to employ disinformation as 
an instrument of influence. This is clearly what occurred in the lead-up to the 2003 
Iraq invasion and in a great many other cases, including Clare Sterling‟s widely-
quoted book about the global, Soviet-directed „terror network‟.43 From this 
perspective, the continual over-reliance on official sources of information, and in 
particular, the use of unnamed security officials, actually undermines the credibility of 
many „terrorist sanctuaries‟ texts and creates a closed system of discourse vulnerable 
to manipulation, error and distortion. 
 Another analytical shortcoming is that the „terrorist sanctuaries‟ discourse 
rests on a series of prior labels, assumptions and narratives that are themselves highly 
contested. Fundamentally, it takes for granted an unproblematic understanding of 
what „terrorism‟ is and which groups are „terrorists‟ – as opposed to „insurgents‟, for 
example. Seldom is it acknowledged that „terrorism‟ is a pejorative label designed to 
de-legitimise specific groups or acts of political violence rather than a social scientific 
category, that no widely accepted definition of terrorism currently exists and that the 
distinction between „terrorist‟ and „insurgent‟ is hardly ever clear-cut. The „terrorist 
sanctuaries‟ discourse also rests on a series of contested neo-realist understandings 
regarding the centrality of states, the competitive nature of international politics and 
the indivisibility of international security.
44
 Perhaps most importantly, the discourse 
assumes that „terrorism‟ poses a serious threat to the security of nations and the wider 
international system – despite significant evidence to the contrary.45 Other implicit 
assumptions in the broader terrorism discourse which are equally contestable or 
dubious include the assumption that „terrorist‟ groups such as al Qaeda are cohesive, 
organised and hierarchical in nature,
46
 that terrorists and „rogue states‟ have a natural 
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coincidence of interests and that terrorists could not operate effectively without the 
assistance or acquiescence of states.
47
 
 Third, and most importantly, the „terrorist sanctuaries‟ discourse itself consists 
of a series of narratives which are in fact, largely unsupported by empirical research, 
or at the very least, open to debate. For example, the notion that failed states provide 
natural sanctuaries or havens for terrorists is far from established; in fact, such 
environments more often pose major difficulties for terrorists.
48
 Related to this, all the 
major empirical studies thus far suggest that there is no direct link between poverty, 
unemployment and alienation, and terrorism.
49
 The same studies also suggest that 
narratives of „Islamic terrorism‟ and the sanctuary that so-called „Islamic extremism‟ 
provides to terrorists are similarly contestable – not least because a large proportion of 
political Islamic or „Islamist‟ movements are in fact, non-violent.50 Marc Sageman for 
example, argues that the vast majority of radical mosques are generally conservative 
institutions and just as likely to constraint as to facilitate terrorist activities.
51
 There 
are also powerful arguments to be made against the narrative that so-called „rogue 
states‟ are eager to sponsor terrorists and provide them with weapons of mass 
destruction – not least because such actions would invite overwhelming retaliation.52 
The assertion that freedom in western states can provide a „haven‟ or „sanctuary‟ is 
also arguable, not least because western states usually have well-resourced capacity 
for tracking and responding to terrorists; it is actually states with limited institutional 
capacity that face the greatest challenges in dealing with terrorist campaigns. Related 
to this, studies demonstrate that, far from being terrorist supporters, media coverage 
of terrorist acts is usually heavily dominated by official views and a focus on 
victims.
53
 Lastly, the argument that the internet provides a kind of virtual „terrorist 
sanctuary‟ is not nearly as straightforward as its proponents suggest. Information 
technology can be both an asset and vulnerability for terrorists – to penetration by the 
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authorities, for example. There is furthermore, no evidence that any terrorist has ever 
been recruited solely via the internet,
54
 although individuals with extremist ideas 
clearly do communicate with each other online.  
Finally, a major analytical shortcoming of the „terrorist sanctuaries‟ discourse 
is that it fails to adequately address the problem of state terror and the way state 
institutions and doctrines and modes of governance, provide a „sanctuary‟ or „haven‟ 
for terrorism. This is a significant omission that undermines the overall credibility of 
the discourse somewhat. The fact is that if terrorism refers to violence directed 
towards or threatened against civilians which is designed to instil terror or intimidate 
a population for political reasons – an entirely uncontroversial definition of terrorism 
fully accepted by terrorism experts such as Byman
55
 – then state terrorism is arguably 
a much greater problem than dissident or non-state terrorism. States after all, have 
killed, tortured and intimidated hundreds of millions of people
56
 over the past few 
decades, and a great many continue to do so today in places like Colombia, Haiti, 
Algeria, Zimbabwe, Myanmar, Uzbekistan,
57
 Kashmir, Palestine, Chechnya, Tibet, 
North Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines and elsewhere.  
More controversially, it can be argued that certain state military practices can 
be considered terroristic, if not terrorism, particularly if we define terrorist acts 
according to their effects on civilians rather than their purported intentions. The 
physical results of such activities carry a much heavier moral weight than alleged – 
and notoriously difficult to prove in law – criminal intent, and bear much more 
heavily on the legitimacy and capital of a political leadership ultimately responsible 
for decisions that impact on the safety and human rights of non-combatants. The use 
of airpower to intimidate and terrorise civilian populations for example, central to 
doctrines of „shock and awe‟ and strategic bombing, could be considered terrorism, as 
it clearly falls within the definition of civilian-directed violence designed to intimidate 
a population for political purposes.
58
 Similarly, counter-insurgency and low-intensity 
conflict practices and pacification campaigns – such as Operation Phoenix in 
Vietnam, Algerian counter-insurgency in the 1990s and arguably, Colombian counter-
insurgency today – are frequently oriented towards intimidating civilian populations 
with state violence to undermine their support for insurgents. A common theme in 
discussions among U.S. low-intensity conflict theorists during the 1980s was how 
„any means‟ were justified in conducting counterrevolutionary warfare, including 
torture, assassination and other forms of civilian-directed brutality.
59
 Some would 
argue that U.S. counter-insurgency training in institutions like the School of the 
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Americas (since renamed the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation) 
constitutes a form of state terrorism sponsorship.
60
  
In effect, there is a pressing analytical question here of why and how so many 
states provide ideological justification for the practice of state terror through doctrines 
of „counter-insurgency‟, „low-intensity conflict‟, „counter-terrorism‟, „national 
security‟, „aerial warfare‟, „coercive diplomacy‟,61 „constructive engagement‟,62 and 
the like (forms of ideological and rhetorical support for terrorism), and why they 
„harbour‟ and protect so many „terrorists‟ (the individuals who engage in bombing, 
murdering, disappearing, torturing and intimidating civilians). Corey Robin has 
convincingly argued that the production of fear lies at the heart of liberal doctrines of 
the state,
63
 suggesting that perhaps the state itself is predisposed to a reliance on 
violence and coercion. Certainly, anthropological studies have shown how the state is 
experienced as a source of terror for ordinary people living under regimes who 
employ terror as a mode of governance, particularly through the extensive use of 
death squads.
64
 At the very least, it can be argued that state terrorism is as important 
as dissident terrorism because it is frequently rooted in relatively permanent structures 
that allow the use of terror to become institutionalised.
65
 From this perspective, 
directing so much academic attention towards the support provided to dissident 
terrorists whilst ignoring the equally serious problem of state terrorism involves a 
considerable loss of analytical focus and intellectual credibility. 
 
Political Bias 
A related problem for the „terrorist sanctuaries‟ discourse is that it has always been 
plagued by a certain political bias and selectivity. For example, an analysis of the 
mainstream terrorism literature during the cold war demonstrates that terrorism 
experts regularly identified Iran, Libya, Cuba, the Soviet Union and many other 
mainly communist countries as „state sponsors‟ of „international terrorism‟, but failed 
to include countries like Israel or South Africa – despite the fact that South Africa, for 
example, not only engaged in numerous acts of terrorism against dissidents in 
neighbouring states but also sponsored movements like Unita and Renamo who 
engaged in extensive terrorism. Similarly, Israeli support for various Christian 
militants in Lebanon is rarely discussed as state sponsorship of terrorism, despite the 
widely accepted evidence of Israeli involvement in the Sabra and Shatilla massacres, 
for example. The „terrorist sanctuaries‟ literature from this period also focused heavily 
on the assistance provided by states like Libya and Syria to groups like the PLO, but 
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failed to discuss U.S. support for groups like Unita, the Afghan mujahaddin, anti-
Castro groups and the Contras, despite the fact these groups engaged in numerous acts 
of terrorism, including planting car-bombs in markets, kidnappings, civilian 
massacres and blowing up civilian airliners.
66
 
 Many would argue that from this perspective, the „terrorist sanctuaries‟ 
discourse has functioned ideologically to distract from and deny the long history of 
the West‟s direct involvement in state terrorism and its support and sanctuary for a 
number of mainly anti-communist terrorist groups. Western involvement in terrorism 
has a long but generally ignored history, which includes: the extensive use of official 
terror by Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, the U.S. and other colonial powers in 
numerous countries throughout the colonial period;
67
 U.S. support and sanctuary for a 
range of right-wing insurgent groups like the Contras and the Mujahideen during the 
cold war, many of whom regularly committed terrorist acts;
68
 U.S. tolerance of Irish 
Republican terrorist activity in the U.S.;
69
 U.S. support for systematic state terror by 
numerous right-wing regimes across the world, perhaps most notoriously El Salvador, 
Chile, Guatemala, Indonesia and Iran;
70
 British support for Loyalist terrorism in 
Northern Ireland
71
 and various other „Islamist‟ groups in Libya and Bosnia, among 
others;
72
 Spanish state terror during the „dirty war‟ against ETA;73 French support for 
terror in Algeria and against Greenpeace in the Rainbow Warrior bombing; Italian 
                                                 
66
 Michael Stohl quotes CIA data that shows that Cuban exile groups engaged in 89 separate terrorist 
incidents from 1969-79 alone. See Stohl, „States, Terrorism and State Terrorism‟, 189; and Herman, 
The Real Terror Network, 63. See also the documented evidence of numerous terrorist attacks by the 
Mujahideen and Unita in Livingston, The Terrorism Spectacle, 48-58 
67
 Evidence of the use of terror by the colonial authorities is contained in an extremely large literature 
on the history and nature of colonialism, as well as the large post-colonialism literature. For more 
immediately accessible summaries of colonial terror, see among others: Ian Beckett, Modern 
Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and their Opponents since 1750 (Routledge, 2001); 
Barker, The No-Nonsense Guide to Terrorism, 61-86; and Herman and O‟Sullivan, The „Terrorism‟ 
Industry, 3-7. 
68
 See, among others: Herman and O‟Sullivan, The „Terrorism‟ Industry; Gareau, State Terrorism and 
the United States; and Livingston, The Terrorism Spectacle. U.S. officials admitted as early as 1983 
that the Contras were engaged in the killing of civilians, kidnapping, torture and indiscriminate attacks. 
It later emerged that a CIA Contra training manual, Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare, 
advocated exactly these kinds of civilian-directed proinsurgency tactics. Similar forms of training were 
provided through proxies to the Afghan insurgents. Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim, 102, 116. 
69
 U.S. official toleration of IRA activity is described in Byman, Confronting Passive Sponsors of 
Terrorism, 21-7. 
70
 Ironically, and in a deliberate attempt to subvert the idea of U.S. support for state terror, many of 
these regimes received U.S. military assistance under the auspices of „counter-terrorism‟ programmes. 
See among others: Alexander George, (ed.), Western State Terrorism (Polity Press, 1991); Herman, 
The Real Terror Network; Herman and O‟Sullivan, The „Terrorism‟ Industry; and Gareau, State 
Terrorism and the United States.  
71
 See Jeffrey Sluka, „“For God and Ulster”: The Culture of Terror and Loyalist Death Squads in 
Northern Ireland‟, in Sluka, (ed.), Death Squad. 
72
 For example, evidence from former British and French intelligence officers suggests that MI6 paid 
large sums of money to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, a terrorist group associated with al Qaeda, 
to assassinate Colonel Gadafy in 1996. It is alleged that British intelligence provided sanctuary to 
members of the group in Britain and subsequently thwarted attempts by Libya to bring Osama bin 
Laden to justice. See „MI6 “halted” Bin Laden Arrest‟, Guardian Weekly November 14-20, 2002. 
There is also evidence that British and American intelligence agencies provided a green light to various 
purported „Islamist‟ groups training insurgents to fight in Bosnia. See Michael Meacher, „Britain now 
faces its own blowback. Intelligence interests may thwart the July bombings investigation‟, The 
Guardian September 10, 2005.  
73
 See Begona Aretxaga, „A Fictional Reality: Paramilitary Death Squads and the Construction of State 
Terror in Spain‟, in Sluka, (ed.), Death Squad; Zulaika and Douglass, Terror and Taboo. 
  15 
sponsorship of right-wing terrorists; and Western support for accommodation with 
terrorists following the end of several high profile wars
74
 – among many other 
examples.  
In short, there is no denying that the discourse has often been used in a highly 
selective and hypocritical manner to highlight some acts of terror whilst selectively 
ignoring others. Arguably, this political bias continues today: the Taliban forces in 
Afghanistan are more often described as terrorists than insurgents, while various 
warlords, including General Rashid Dostum, are rarely called terrorists, despite 
overwhelming evidence of the use of terror and intimidation against civilians by many 
Afghan warlords.
75
 This situation is mirrored in Somalia, where the Islamist Al Itihad 
Al Islamiya group is typically described as a terrorist organisation with links to al 
Qaeda, while U.S.-supported Somali warlords who also use violence against civilians 
are exempted from the terrorist label.
76
 Similarly, Cuba remains on the State 
Department‟s list of „state sponsors of terrorism‟ largely because it hosts a few former 
ETA members, but continued U.S. sanctuary and support of anti-Castro terrorists,
77
 
former Latin American state terrorists
78
 and other assorted Asian anticommunist 
groups
79
 is completely ignored. And Iran and Syria‟s sponsorship of Palestinian 
terrorist groups is the subject of substantial academic analysis, while Pakistan‟s 
support for Kashmiri militants rarely featured in the first few years of the „war on 
terror‟ – although it is now an increasingly prominent point of contention.80 Most 
glaringly, and as already mentioned, the state terror of countries like Uzbekistan, 
Colombia and Indonesia – and continued tolerance and support for it from  the U.S.81 
– is simply never discussed in the mainstream „terrorist sanctuaries‟ literature. The 
result of these omissions is a discourse that for whatever reasons appears to many 
outside observers as biased towards official U.S. views. 
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From a discourse analytic perspective, it can be argued that the „terrorist 
sanctuaries‟ discourse is always in danger of promoting a narrow set of partisan 
interests and discrete political projects. For example, the discourse describes an 
almost infinite number of potential „terrorist sanctuaries‟ or „havens‟, each of which 
then logically becomes a legitimate target for various kinds of counter-terrorism 
measures. As noted above, the literature identifies a large list of potential „terrorist 
havens‟, including: all failed, weak or poor states; the widely accepted list of state 
sponsors of terrorism; a much longer list of passive state sponsors of terrorism; states 
with significant Muslim populations; Islamic charities and NGOs; informal, 
unregulated banking and economic systems; the media; the internet; diasporas in 
western countries; groups and regions characterised by poverty and unemployment; 
the criminal world; radical Islamist organisations; mosques and Islamic schools; 
insurgent and revolutionary movements; and „extremist‟ ideologies – among others. 
The identification of these groups and domains as „terrorist sanctuaries‟ or „havens‟ 
consequently functions to permit a range of restrictive and coercive actions against 
them – all in the name of counter-terrorism. That is, the discourse can be deployed 
politically in a variety of ways: domestically for example, it can be used to discipline 
society, demonise dissent, control the media, enhance the powers of the security 
services, centralise executive power, create a surveillance society and expand state 
regulation of social life. 
In addition to this broad legitimating function, the „terrorist sanctuaries‟ 
discourse can also support a range of discrete political projects and partisan interests, 
including: re-targeting the focus of military force from dissident groups and 
individuals (which privileges law enforcement) to states (which privileges the 
powerful military-industrial complex); legitimating broader counter-insurgency 
programmes where the real aims lie in the maintenance of a particular political-
economic order;
82
 de-legitimising all forms of counter-hegemonic or revolutionary 
struggle, thereby functioning as a means of maintaining the liberal international order; 
and selectively justifying projects of regime change,
83
 economic sanctions, military 
base expansion, military occupation, military assistance for strategic partners, and the 
isolation of disapproved political movements. In the end, the discourse functions – in 
its present form – to permit the extension of state hegemony both internationally and 
domestically. Far from being an objective academic analysis therefore, it may serve a 
number of distinctly ideological purposes. 
 
Ineffectual Policies 
A final criticism of the „terrorist sanctuaries‟ discourse is that it has proved in its 
prescriptions to be largely ineffectual and in many cases, counter-productive. In 
particular, the policy of employing military force against „terrorist sanctuaries‟ or 
„havens‟, a reasonable policy within the confines of the discourse, actually has an 
astonishing record of failure. For example, Israel has mounted military strikes and 
targeted assassination against „terrorist sanctuaries‟ in the Palestinian territories and 
surrounding states for over fifty years without any significant reduction in the overall 
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level of terrorism. The apartheid regime in South Africa adopted a similarly futile 
policy against its neighbours during the 1980s, carrying out numerous raids, 
bombings and assassinations. U.S. military strikes on Libya in 1986, Sudan and 
Afghanistan in 1998 and the use of force in the current war on terror against 
Afghanistan and Iraq, have all failed to noticeably reduce the overall number of 
terrorist attacks against U.S. interests. More broadly, the use of military force against 
„terrorist sanctuaries‟ in Colombia, Chechnya, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, 
Turkey, Spain and elsewhere has in every case failed to appreciably affect the level of 
terrorist violence.  
It could even be argued that the attempts since September 11 to eliminate 
„terrorist sanctuaries‟ in Afghanistan, Iraq, and South Lebanon in particular, have had 
the opposite effect – despite premature claims of success in Afghanistan following the 
fall of the Taliban. In reality, these military interventions have solidified and greatly 
strengthened various Middle Eastern insurgent and „terrorist‟ groups, reinforced new 
militant movements and coalitions in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, provided new 
regions of conflict where dissident groups can gain military experience, and greatly 
increased overall levels of anti-Western sentiment across the region.
84
 It is probable 
that the price of these policies will be many more years of insurgency in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and an ongoing terrorist campaign against U.S. interests (and those of its 
close allies) which will in turn, demand further military actions against „terrorist 
sanctuaries‟; such is the circular logic of the discourse. The main problem of course, 
is that the discourse focuses on the symptoms and enablers of dissident terrorism, 
rather than its underlying causes and poses a palliative remedy rather than a curative 
one. From one perspective, it is actually an impediment to dealing with terrorism 
because it functions as a closed system of discourse, preventing discussion of the 
political grievances which cause individuals and groups to seek out places of 
sanctuary from where they can launch attacks in the first place. 
 
Conclusion 
There is a need for researchers and public officials to be far more reflective and 
critical of the language they employ and the „knowledge‟ they produce, because 
discourse and knowledge is never neutral; it always works for someone and for 
something. In this case, the language and knowledge of the „terrorism sanctuaries‟ 
discourse frequently works to maintain the hegemony of certain powerful states and a 
particular international order which is beneficial to a few but violent and unjust to 
many more. It also works to obscure the much greater violence and suffering caused 
by current Western counter-terrorism policies (which have cost the lives of well over 
40,000 civilians
85
 and caused incalculable material destruction since September 11, 
2001), the double standards and selectivity of Western approaches to terrorism and 
the ongoing problem of civilian-directed state terror.  
 A more humanistic and intellectually honest approach to „terrorist sanctuaries‟ 
would begin with an exploration of the ways in which states and their accompanying 
doctrines of „national security‟, „counter-insurgency‟ and „counter-terrorism‟ 
frequently provide a „haven‟ for the wholesale terror inflicted on civilian populations 
around the globe. It would also involve an honest appraisal of the ways in which 
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many modern democracies have sponsored, supported, tolerated and given sanctuary 
to some forms of terrorism while simultaneously demonising others. It has been 
argued that the level of terrorism in the international system is directly related to the 
extent that the great powers – who set the standards of acceptable conduct in the 
international system – practice, condone and support terrorist behaviour themselves.86 
Moreover, dissident terrorism can sometimes be a reaction to prior state terror; 
certainly, a number of contemporary terrorist groups have their origins in the 
„environment of impunity created by state terror during the late Cold War.‟87 From 
this perspective, all forms of terrorism – „theirs‟ and „ours‟, dissident and state-
directed – can be understood as part of a single historical-political process. The issue 
of how to deal with „terrorist sanctuaries‟ therefore, goes far beyond narrow 
conceptions of national security, deterrence or pre-emption. Instead, it calls for a 
profound re-evaluation of both the theory and practice of counter-terrorism and an 
appreciation of the need to construct a more just and equitable international order 
based on a morally consistent notion of human security.  
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